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ABSTRACT 
Building codcs eovcr only thc mini~nnm requirclnc~nts for fire safcty and leave a~np le  
room for the expel-tisc and conscience of the I~uilding designer. Providing Iifc safety starts 
\vith securing conditions under which sufficient time is left for thc occtlpants to escape froni 
an incipient fire. It also involves measures that reduce the prol~ability of exposure of the oc- 
c~ipants to smoke and ensnrc their evacuation from thc fire-stricken area. The safety of both 
life and property is served by ensuring the s t r~~ctura l  integrity of all key elements of the 
I>uilding even in spreading fires, but at  the same tinie enlploying all available techniques 
to confine the firc to its place of origin. 
K ( ~ ! ~ t c o r t l s :  Building design, design, firc p~otclction, fire safety, building codes. 
Nomenclature 
A area, ft2 
B constant, = 39.74 11) R/ftVor air and 
gaseous prodl~cts of fire 
g acceleration due to gravity, = 4.17 x 
loh ft/h2 
G total fire load, 111 
h height, ft 
H height of building, ft 
p pressure, Il>/ft 11" 
AT) pressure difference, ll,/ft h2 
P perimeter of building, ft 
y heat flux, H t u / f t h  
2' temperature, 13 (if not otherwise spec- 
ified) 
J nlass flow rate to compartment, lb/h 
1' infiltration inass flow rate, Il>/h 
W pressurization mass flow rate, Ib/h 
elevation, ft 
Creek letters 
a ecluivale~~t orifice area, ft"ft2 
/3 orifice factor, ;- 0.6, dilllensionless 
T 1>~'riod of fully developed fire, h 
x pressure factor, dimensionless 
' I'rc~sc~nted at the Society of Wood Sciclnce and 
Technology Symposium, Trends in Firc Protection, 
Session 111-New Developments, Madison, WI, 20 
April 1977. This paper is a coutribntion from thc 
Division of Rnilding Research, Xational Research 
Conncil of Canada and is published with the ap- 
proLal of the Director of the Division. 
Subscripts 
of outside atmosphere, of air 





of colllpartment gases 
of the interior of building 
at the level z = O 
for room 
for shaft-corridor partition 
for shaft 
for l~ncompartinented space 
for outside wall 
of window 
Of the many topics that could be dis- 
cussed under this title, only a few deemed 
to be of primary interest to this audience 
will be dealt with in this paper. 
Buildings with a minimum fire hazard 
are fire-safc. A fire-safe building can be 
defined as onc for which there is a high 
probability that all occupants will survive 
a fire without injury, and in which property 
damage will be confined to the immediate 
vicinity of the fire area. 
Thcre are numerous, mostly complemen- 
tary, ways of achieving fire safety, not all of 
which are related to buildii~g design. Those 
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that are, concern ( 1 ) layout and dimension- 
ing of the I~uilding and its constituent parts, 
( 2 )  l ,~~vis ion  of safety deviccs and f acili- 
tics, iuld ( 3 )  selection of constrnction ma- 
terials. 
The ininimu~i~ requirements for safety are 
dealt with, in law, by building codes. The 
dcsiguc,r is allowed, however, to use cquiv- 
;dent or better solutions and to choose safer 
111nterials. All in all, the level of fire safety 
i l l  I~l~ilding depends, to a largc extent, on 
the conscie~ice of thc designer, and the pro- 
visioil of safety at a minimum cost clepcnds 
on his expertise. 
Three subject areas have been selected 
to ilhlstrate the role of circumspect dcsigil 
in the provision of fire safety: the growth 
of fire, the smoke prol~lem, and the fully 
developed fire. Of these thc first two are 
rclatcd mainly to the aspect of life safety, 
\\.hereas the third is concerned with both 
lifc safety and safety of property. 
THE GROWTH OF FII<E 
At least fonr out of five fires start from 
rc.latively slnall ignition xources (Her1 and 
1 lalpin 1976). Whether the snlall fire dies 
out or grows into a large fire depends on 
the co~lditio~ls in the environment of the 
source fire. If they are favourable for thc 
growth of fire, "flashover" will ensue and 
the cntire compartment that contains the 
source I~ecomes involved in fire. Flashover, 
if it occurs, follows the flaming ignition of 
;L 1argc.r ol~ject in the co~npartn~ent usually 
i l l  5 to 20 111in. 
The time, of flashover is ail extremely im- 
portant piece of information, hecausc it in- 
dicates the maxirnnin amount of time that 
the occupants have to escape or be res- 
cued. For this reason thorough under- 
standing of the chain of events that con- 
nects thc ignition of the source item with 
the flasliovc~r has become, in recent years, 
one of the n~ajor objects of theoretical and 
cxperiiliental fire research ( Gross 1974; 
Croce and Emmons 1974; Smith and Clark 
1975; Croce 1975; Rlodak 1976; Quintiere 
1976; Enlmons 1977). 
For soine time followii~g ignition, the 
source iten1 burns in approximately the 
salne way as it would in the open. Then, 
as flanles s ~ r e a d  over the surface of the 
Yomce item, and perhaps to other con- 
tiguous items, the process of burning be- 
comes i~lfluenced more and more by the 
environment. Heat is fed back from the 
surrounding objects, especially from the 
conlpartinent boundaries, and augments the 
rate of burning. With increasing rapidity 
a layer of hot snloky gayes builds up below 
the ceiling. As Fig. 1 shows, intense radiant 
encrgy fluxes originating mainly from the 
hot ceiling and the adjacent smoke layer 
gradually heat up the contents of the com- 
partment and, up011 reaching a level of 
about 1.7 to 2.1 W/cm"Fang 1975), 
ignite, in quick succession, all combustible 
items within; flashover occurs. [Expcri- 
mental studiej (Gross 1974; Htigglund et al. 
1974) indicate that the attainment of a tem- 
perature of 500 to 600 C by the hot gas lay- 
er can also be regarded as a flashover cri- 
terion.] 
A few fire "sceilarios" of practical in- 
terest were rccently surveyed by Benjamin 
( 1976). He pointed out that combustible 
wall and ceiling linings may or may not 
play n substantial part in the chain of 
events leading to flashover, depending on 
the total fire load, distribution of the cum- 
bustiblc items, and location and size of the 
source fire. On the one end of the safety 
scale are deasely furnished rooms vvitll 
large combustible contents (i.e., with high 
"fire load") and with items of high specific 
surfacc ( to be discussed). The time to 
flashover for such rooms is verv short, re- 
gardless of the nature of the lining ma- 
terials. On the other end of the scale are 
the sparsely furnished rooms. For these a 
combustible wall lining may become the 
principal path of fire spread and, therefore, 
thc presence or absencc of such linings niay 
mean the ditference l~ctween 5hort tlasli- 
ovcr time or no flashover at all. Naturally, 
for rooms lined with combustible nlaterials 
the location and size of the source fire arc 
of extreme importance. Bruce's experi- 
rnellts ( 1959) showed that the natnre of the 
\valls had very little effect on the time to 
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FIG. 1. Pre-fla\llo\~c,~. fire 
flashover when no comb~istible item was 
closer than 18 inches to the ~valls. 
The so-called "oxgyen indcx" method 
(Fenin~ore and Martin 1966; ASTM D2863- 
74) provides a convellieilt way of arrang- 
ing various materials according to their 
lial~ilities of becoming sources of fire. 
(Table 1 gives the oxygen index for a few 
co111mo11 materials.) The oxygen index does 
not, however, reflect the increased or de- 
creased liability associated with the shape, 
surface texture, and orientation of an ob- 
ject. I t  is common knowledge that an ob- 
ject wit11 large "specific surface area" (ex- 
ternal surface area per unit weight) is nlore 
easily ignited than a bulky object. I t  takes 
coilsidcrable effort to ignite a massive piece 
of wood furniture, whereas other objects of 
cellulosic materials, for examplc cotton 
fabric or sheets of paper, flame up quite 
reaclil y. 
Unfortunately, there is no reliable test 
method to date that could be used to pre- 
dict the burning characteristics of various 
~nnterials once the fire has grown beyond 
its incipient stage. Benjamin (1976) doc- 
urnented with data borrowed from a report 
by Castiilo et al. (1975) that flanlespread 
ratings derived from standard tunnel tests 
(ASTM E 84-76a) do not necessarily place 
the various lining materials in the correct 
order as far as the hazard of early flashover 
is concerned. Friedinan ( 1975 ) noted that 
some fire-retarded panels, though not read- 
ily ignitable, once ignited spread flames 
just as fast as nonretarded panels. 
These findings come as no surprise to 
those familiar with fire-performance tests. 
For the sakc of ensuring the commensur- 
ability of the results, i.e., the ability of ar- 
ranging the results on a unique quality 
scale, these tests are conducted under a 
specified set of conditions which rarely, if 
ever, coincide satisfactorily with those aris- 
ing in actual fires. For example, the rate of 
flame spread is known to depend signifi- 
cantly on the radiant energy flux to the lin- 
ing material (Alvares 1975; Fernandez- 
Pello 1977). There is evidence ( Tewarson 
and Pion 1976) that strong energy fluxes, 
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such as those arising in real-\vorld fires, 
may completely upset thc ranking of vari- 
ous lining ~naterials by standard tunnel 
tests. If it is realized that the level of ther- 
nlal radiation is only O I ~ C  of the numerous 
factors that niay have important bearing 
on  the plienonicnon of flame spread, one 
will recognize the prol~lems associated with 
clerivi~ig meaningful but simple perfor- 
mance tests. 
T l ~ c  most important requirements that 
1lr11st I)e followed to prevent fast develop- 
ing fircs are covered in building codes, 
which regulate what can be I~uilt  into a 
b~~iltling, and fire codes, which control 
what can be brought into it. Typical items 
that fire codes are concerned with include 
~novable partitions, floor covering and 
decorating materials, drapes, and curtains, 
for use in buildings of dense occupancy. 
Thcse itenis must be subjected to various 
performance tests (Suini 1975) that will, it 
is hopecl, some idea of their propensi- 
ties for 1)cconiing ignition sources and prop- 
agating fire. 
The building code regulations that have 
some bearing on the time to flashover arc 
those that restrict the use of combustible 
lining materials. Conventionally, interior 
finishes having flame spread ratings higher 
than 150 are not allowed in buildings of 
dense occupancy in many parts of North 
America. Further restrictions are imposed 
on the flamespread ratings of linings used 
in exits. A recent addition to building 
codes requires that foam plastics, which 
have been known to spread fire much faster 
under realistic fire conditions than in per- - 
formance tests, be covered air-tight with - 
imnfoamed linings. 
The safety of a building can be improved 
further by circumspect design. The build- 
ing designer knows the intended use of the 
building and, therefore, has at least a rough 
idea of the types of articles that may be 
brought into the various compartments up- 
on completion of the building. He can add 
valuable minutes to thc time to flashover 
by avoiding extensive use of comblistible 
linings in those conlpartmcrits that are most 
likely to be furnished with fabric-covered 
(u~holstcrcd)  items, or in which clothing 
articles are kept or stored. He call further 
heighten the level of fire safety by pro- 
viding closets and built-in cabinets for the 
L, 
storage of cloth and paper products. In the 
design of theatres, lecture rooms, atriun~s, 
lounges, etc. he can specify slightly cle- 
vated or recessed walk-ways or built-in 
planters along walls that are to be lined 
with conibl~stible materials, and thus pre- 
vent the occupants or interior decorator 
from placing upholstered furniture close to 
those surfaces. 
In closing this subject, it may I)e appro- 
priate to n~ention bricfly the sprinkler sys- 
tem. because its chief function is to prevent 
incipient fires fro111 reaching the flashover 
stage. Except for buildings with very large 
uncompartmented spaces, the use of sprin- 
kler system is an optional measure, but its 
use is often rewarded by the reduction of 
other building code requirements and by 
lower insurance premiums. The principles 
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of designing a sprinkler system are well consideration. Accumulated data (Sumi 
know11 (Tryon and McKinnon 1969) and and Tsuchiya 1975) indicate, however, that 
will not be discussed here. other toxic gases such as hydrogen cyanide, 
hydrogen chloride, nitrogen dioxide, and 
TIIE SMOKE I'ROHLEM sulfur dioxide may be the cause of fire 
deaths or injuries inore often than is com- 
Fire statistics reveal (Uerl and Halpin monly believed. 
1976; I-IMSO 1971; Thomas 1974) that morc To ensure the safety of the occupants, the 
people die in burning buildillgs from in- illstallation of fire detectors and fire alarms 
halation of toxic fire gases than from heat- has been made mandatory in certain build- 
inflicted injuries. Even in those deaths that 
ings, those of high occupant Con- are caused by l)urns, smoke is often a con- centration. Ill addition, in buildings with 
tributing factor; dense smoke obscures the air circulatillg systems, the installation of 
vision of the occupants and prevents them slnoke detectors in the main ducts is also 
froin reaching safety. req~~ired .  Detection of smoke in the main 
Many clauses in building codes relate to return duct is followed by the shutdown of 
facilitating escape from fire-stricken build- the fall alld by the actuation of the 
ings. Regulations cover the width of exits fire dampers of the duct system. 
as a function of occupant concentration, ~ ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ,  dispersion of fire gases in 
distancc, between exits, access routes to a tall building is possible even after shut- 
exits, location and illun~ination of exit signs, dowll of ,.he air-handling system. ~h~ 
and the maxinium length of dead-end cor- smoke call be carried by natural air cur- 
ridors. In addition, restrictions are grad- re,ts t,, far places ill the building. ~h~~~ 
d l y  introduced on the use of materials are docurnented cases hulldreds of deaths 
that have a propeilsity for high smoke gen- caused by smoke inhalatioll at large dis- 
eration. However, efforts to provide a ra- tallccs from the locatioll of fire. 
tioilal basis for restricting the use of the Air currents that disperse fire gases 
worst snloke-prodllcing materials are ham- throughout the building develop as a reslllt 
pered by two difficulties. The smoke-pro- of the "leakagen of the outside walls of the 
ducing characteristics of most materials de- building, alld are induced by temperature 
pend quitc substantially on the temperature differellces between the interior and ex- 
and oxygen concentration of the surround- terior For the latter reason, 
ing atlnosphere (Tsuchiya and Sumi 1974) they are strOllgest during the winter heat- 
as wc.11 as on the rate of flow of air past the iI,g Figure 2a illustrates schem:,t- 
1)uruing object (Gaskill 1973; Robertson ically the dominant air currents in a nine- 
1973) ; consequently those nlaterials that storey office building in the winter ( with 
prove poor performers in laboratory tests the air-handling system sllut down). ~h~ 
rnay be acceptable under actual fire con- buildillg is showll to consist of four types 
dition.~, or vice versa. The other difficulty of spaces: rooIns ( R ) ,  corridors ( c ), un- 
is that processes introduced to retard the compartmented spaces ( u ) ,  and 
flame-spreading characteristics of lining and elevator shafts, referred to here joilltly 
~naterials are often responsible for increased as shafts ( S ) If the leakage characteris- 
smoke production tics of the outside wall are uniform, the in- 
So far there has not been any attempt to filtration of air takes place below the mid- 
restrict the use of inaterials on the basis of height of the building. After passing 
their propensities for generating toxic de- through various partitions, it enters the 
composition or combustioll products. The shafts, rises to the upper floors of the build- 
most likely reason is that carbon ~nonoxide, ing, moves toward the outside wall, and ex- 
which may be produced by any material as filtrates to the outside atmosphere. Ae- 
a result of incomplete combustion, is still cause of the important role the stacklike 
believed to be the only toxic gas worth shafts play, the phenomenon is often re- 
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FI~: .  2. Illl~strntion of snlolce l~rol)le~n in a 9-storey officc bllilding ( a )  .4ir currents, ( b )  Pressure 
tlistril)~~tion, ( c )  Smoke distl.ib11tion (fire on first storey). 
tcrrcd to as air movement by "stack effect" of a \imple multistorey building can be 
or "chimnc~y effect." (The small air cur- represellted by a serics of straight lines, as 
rent\ that risc from storey to storey through shown in Fig. 2b. ( I n  rcnlity, the lines for 
the ceilings are not takcn into account in the rooms, corridors, and uncompartmented 
pre5cnt discussion.) spacey show slight discontinuities at the 
The rate of- air flo\v depcnds on the leak- ceiling of each storey.) They can be de- 
ine\s of the outr;idc \valls ancl the various scribed by the following ecyuation: 
interior partitions of thc building. Since the 
tlow through sinall holes or gaps can be 
treated as flow through orifices, it is usual 
to characterize the leakiness of a building 
c~lement by its "equivalent orifice area," a, 
which is the aggregate area of (often in- 
visil~le) holes, cracks, gaps, etc., referred to 
unit area of the building clement. An anal- 
ysis of the situation illustrated in Fig. 2a 
requires information on three of these 
c~luivaleilt orifice arcas: a,,, that for the 
outside walls, a,,  that for the corridor-room 
partitions, and a,, that for the shaft-corridor 
partitions. 
The tlirect causes of air lnovernent in a 
1,uilcling are, naturally, thc pressure diffcr- 
ences that cxist 1,etween the constituent 
spaces of thc building. Experime~ltal stud- 
ies of heated niultistorey buildings (Tain- 
ura and Wilso~l 1966, 1967) indicate that 
the pressure clistributio~l along the height 
~vhere p,,, the pressure of the outside atmo- 
sphere, is 
provided that its value at z = 0 is taken as 
the reference pressure level. For conve- 
nience pressures are expressed in l b / f  F. 
To obtain values in inches of water, multi- 
ply values in lb/ft h2 by 4.61 X 10 lo. 
If x = 0, Eq. ( 1 ) obviously describes the 
pressure of the outside atmosphere. With 
x = 1, the variation of the pressure in the 
shafts, ps ,  is obtained. The values of x for 
the other three types of building spaces 
namely xJe (for rooms), xr! (for corridors), 
ancl xu (for uncompartmented spaces) can 
be calculated if the three equivalent orifice 
areas, a , ,  a,, and a, are known. In general, 
however, it is sufficiently accurate to use 
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the following values: xrr = 0.8, X ( G  = X m  = 
0.9. 
Since a,, is usually much smaller than 
either a, or a,, it is permissible (as well as 
convenient) to assume that the only resis- 
tance to the movement of air is that offered 
by the outside walls of the building. With 
this assumption, the total rate of air infiltra- 
tion can be calculated as follows ( McGuire 
and Tamura 1975) : 
v,, = (pa,,. P B) (3T,,)-' 
[g( l  - Tl,/T,)I1/VII"'" ( 3 )  
Surveys of the leakage characteristics of ex- 
terior walls of tall buildings (Tamura and 
Wilson 1967; Tamura and Shaw 1976) in- 
dicate that, for lack of morc accurate in- 
formation, a,,. ;= 0.0005 f t2/f tVs a reason- 
aldy conservative selection. 
If fire breaks out below midheight of the 
l)uilcling, the air currents rising in the shafts 
carry the smoke and distribute it to the 
conrpartments on the upper levels. Figure 
2c shows the pattern of smoke distribution 
in the nine-storey building 10 to 15 min 
after the outbreak of fire on the first floor. 
(The smoke contamination of the storey 
above the fire floor is caused by vertical 
leakage currents nlentioned earlier.) 
The inost obvious step the building de- 
siglrer call take to alleviate the smoke prob- 
lern is to avoid specifying lining materials 
that are known to be heavy smoke pro- 
ducers or that generate highly toxic decom- 
position and combustion products. Yet, this 
"11;~ssive" method of defence is rarely suf- 
ficient. From among the "active" methods 
three will be discussed here briefly: smoke 
clihttion, provision of refuge areas, and 
building pressurization. 
I n  milder climates, where the role of stack 
effect in smoke dispersioil may not be sig- 
nificant, the technique of diluting the 
smoke is often used in keeping certain vital 
parts of the building, such as lol~bies and 
stairwells, relatively free of smoke. It  is 
believed (McGuire et al. 1970) that dilu- 
tion with fresh air in a 100 to 1 proportion 
will ensure safe conditions with respect to 
both visibility and toxicity. The inforina- 
tion needed for the design of srnoke dilu- 
tion systems includes the equivalent orifice 
area for the boundaries of the space to be 
kept smoke-free and the rate of smoke gen- 
eration by the fire. (The latter can be esti- 
mated as described by Harmathy 1972.) 
Detailed studies have revealed (Gal- 
breath 1969; Pauls 1975) that the time for 
evacuating a building in case of fire is ap- 
proximately proportional to the building 
height and, depending on the occupant con- 
centration, may take much longer than the 
expected duration of an average fire. Con- 
sequentIy, complete evacuation of a build- 
ing above a certain height, say 10 to 15 
storeys, does not seem practicable. The 
danger of exposing the occupants to smoke 
can be greatly reduced by providing pres- 
surized refuge areas, preferably in the 
vicinity of a stairwell, where the occupants 
can stay in relative safety for the duration 
of the fire. The required rate of air supply 
to these areas is not likely to be determined 
by the leakage characteristics of its bound- 
aries, but rather by the need for maintain- 
ing tolerable conditions for the assembled 
occupants. The required minimum flow 
rate of fresh air is 15 ftymin per person 
(ASHRAE 62-73). 
The most effective way of preventing the 
spread of smoke is to pressurize the entire 
building or some major parts of it. Smoke 
travel through the shafts to the upper 
storeys of the building is eliminated if the 
pressure everywhere in the building, or at 
least in the vertical shafts, is raised above 
that of the outside atmosphere. This can be 
accomplished by supplying air to the in- 
terior at  a rate sufficient to shift the pres- 
sure distribution in the shafts (see line A-A 
in Fig. 2b) to a new position (line 0-A') 
which is characterized by the equality of 
the internal and external pressures at the 
ground floor level ( at z = 0) .  The required 
rate of air supply is ( McGuire and Tamura 
1975). 
i.e., roughly three times the rate of infiltra- 
tion of air i17to the building under normal 
conditions. As Fig. 2b shows, the pressure 
difference, h p ,  against which the supply 
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fan 11as to work, is equal to thc difference 
l~etween the pressure of the outside atmo- 
sphere and shaft pressure on the ground 
floor levc4. Thus, from Eq. ( 1  ) with z = 0. 
There are two ways of achic,ving building 
pressurization. The more popular method 
is converting the air-handling system of the 
l~uilding to emergency operatiol~ and vent- 
ing the fire floor (Tamura et al. 1970). The 
conversion entails the shutdown of the re- 
turn and exhaust fails of the system, to- 
gether with their associated branch and 
outside dampers. This method, however, 
has some pitfalls ( Tamura and McGuire, 
1973). 
Pressurization can be more conveniently 
achieved by injecting outside air into all 
shafts at the top of the building. Additional 
ndv~untages (and savings in energy con- 
sumption call be gained hy preheating the 
air to only slightly al~ovc the 32 F level 
( p ~ ) v i d e d  that the outside temperature is 
I~elow the freezing point). As the cool air 
lowclrs the temperature i11 the shafts and 
parts of the building, the pressure in the 
I~uilding further increases (see A'-A" in 
Fig. 2b) and the flushing out of smoke from 
thc building is accelerated. 
The discussion of smokr coiltrol tech- 
niq~les has been restricted here to the sim- 
plc,st high-rise buildings, those with uni- 
form compartmentation and with shafts 
that run the ft111 height of the building. In 
more complex situations the dcsign is rarely 
possible without a comptlter-aided analysis 
( Barrvtt and 1,ocklin 1968; Tamura 1969; 
FVakamatsu 1976). Moreover, even for 
simpler buildings, invoking the computer 
may be necessary if building pressurization 
is combined with other techniques (Tam- 
ura 1970; Fung and Zile 1975). 
A supplenie~~t to the National Building 
Code of Canada (Assoc. Comm. on Nat. 
Build. Code 1973) contains an exhaustive 
survey of rneasures for providing fire safety 
in high l~uildiugs. Some of them are just 
cornmoll-sense solutions and impose very 
little restriction on the design. 
THE FULLY DEVELOPED FIRE 
The curve shown in Fig. 3 is typical of 
the temperature history of a fire confined 
to a single compartment and unattended 
by fire fighters. During the growth period 
of the fire the temperature of the compart- 
ment gases is grossly nonuniform (see Fig. 
1 )  and the average temperature increases 
slowly. At flashover the windows break 
and the period of "fully developed fire" sets 
in. It is characterized by much higher tem- 
peratures and improved uniforinity in the 
spatial distribution of temperature. The 
temperature becomes nonuniform again 
and drops steadily as the fire enters its third 
period, the "decay" period, during which 
the flames die out and the charring remains 
of the fuel oxidize. 
Because professional help by fire-fighters 
must not be taken for granted, the building 
designer has to accept responsibility for us- 
ing the best available knowledge and tech- 
niques to ensure that a fire, no matter 
where it may break out, will remain local- 
ized and relatively benign. As roughly 70% 
of the fuel energy is released during its fully 
developed period, the characteristics of fire 
during this period are obviously of utmost 
inlportailce in planiling a defence. 
I t  is traditionally held that a building 
subdivided by fire-resistant elements into 
reasonably sized compartments provides the 
hest assurance against destructive fires. 
While there is little quarrel about the merits 
of fire-resistant compartmentation, the 
method of deciding on the required fire 
resistance of the dividing elelnents and the 
way of determining it have come under in- 
creasing criticism. 
The standard fire resistance test (ASTM 
E 119-76) is still the most widely accepted 
way of evaluating the fire-resistant quality 
of building elements. Unforturiately this test 
suffers from the same defect as most other 
fire tests standards, ilamely that for the sake 
of ensuring comnlensurability of the test 
results on a unique quality scale, the test 
collditions are idealized to an unjustifiable 
extent. By scrutiilizing the way the stan- 
dard tests are conducted and the test results 
evaluated, one will find that the philosophy 
PIC:. 3. 're1llperat111.e history of :I typical firc. 
of tire resistance, testing is basetl on the 
following four assumptions: 
1 ) the severity of fire in a conlpartment is 
unicluely deterlniiled by the fire load; 
2 )  the fire always develops in a definitc, 
Inanncr characterized 1,y :i uniclue ten)- 
perature-time curve; 
3 )  the spread of fire is clue to thermal or 
structural failure of an element (wall, 
floor, or ceiling) of the compartment 
boundary; and, therefore, 
4 )  structural failure because of exposurt) 
of a 1)oundary element from two side's is 
not l~ossil~le. 
Whereas the fallacy of the first two as- 
sunlptions is clearly recognized now, and 
they arc gradually being eliminated from 
tiiotlern practices of firc resistance evalna- 
ti011 (Pettersson c.t al. 1976), the inade- 
(1~1acy of the third and fourth assumptions 
is still not fully realized. 
Even though 1,uilding elements inay oc- 
casiol~ally fail in ways assulr~cd 11y the phi- 
losopfiy of fire resistance testing,  lamely 
1)y conduction of heat through, or collapse 
of, one or Inore boundaries of the co111- 
partment on fire (see Fig. 4a) ,  in the vast 
majority of cases the spread of flaming corn- 
1,nstion is a convective-radiant process. 
Thr, flames are driven by pressure differ- 
ences from one conlpartment to another, 
either horizontally, mainly through doors 
left open 11y the cbscapi~ig occlipa~~ts, or ver- 
FIG. 4. h l~chan i s~ns  of fire sprrzid ( a )  ?rl(sch- 
:tnisms i~lrplied. by tlie philosophy of fir($ tvsting 
( I ) )  Actl~al mcc.h:i~iis~lls. 
tically through poorly fire-stopped open- 
ings and by flames issuing from windows 
and then jumping to the storey u1,ove (Fig. 
411). Conseclucntly, the fact alone that a 
1)uilding is well compartmcnted and the 
conipartmcnt bou~~daries  are fire resistant 
(in the conventional sense) is n o  assurance 
against fire spread. 
Once the firc has spread (horizontally or 
vertically) to a ncighbouri~lg cornp:irtm(wt, 
the building element, wall or floor, that 
forms the common bo~lndary of the two 
compartments becomes exposed to fire 011 
110th sides, a condition not considered in the 
standard test practiccxs. Consequently, an 
elelnent judged from a standard firc test as 
sufficiently fire resistant may collapse in a 
real-world ( spreading) fire. 
Because, as discussed, the lack of provi- 
sion for two-sided fire exposure is only onc 
of several weaknesses in the standard fire 
resistance test procedure, the current prac- 
tic<. of provicling safety is somewhat illu- 
wry. Fortunately, the characteristics of 
fully developed (postflashover) fires are 
fairly well understood by no\i7, and it is 110s- 
sil~le to devise truly effective measures 
against destructive fires. 
From an analysis of the results of hun- 
clretls of compartment burnout tests (Kawa- 
goe, 1958; Gross and Robertson 1965; 
13utcher et al. 1966, 1967) and some ear- 
lier theoretical studies ( Kawagoe 1967, 
Thomas ct al. 1967; 3lagnusson and 
Thelandersson 1970), the follo~ving three 
parnnieters have bee11 iiitroducecl to char- 
acterize the "severity" (destructive po- 
tential ) of fully developed fires (Ilarmathy 
1972): its duration, r (see Fig. 3 ) ;  the 
average telrlperature of the compartment 
gases, l'!,; anti the "effective heat flux," q,$, 
i.e., tlre average heat flux that penetrates 
the conipartinent boundaries. All three de- 
pend priniarily on two varial~lcs, the total 
"fir(. load" ( the amount of combustibles in 
the conrpartmcmt), G, and the rate of entry 
of ;iir into the compartment (ventilation) 
Cr,,. ?'!, and y, also depend, to a lesser de- 
gree, on thca size of tlre compartnlent and 
the thermal properties of the lining ma- 
terials. 
If the doors remain closed and air enters 
only tlirougli the I~roken windows of the 
conlpnrtnient, 
As long as tlre fire load consists predom- 
inantly ( in 8S to 9074 ) cellulosic materials 
in the form of ordinary furnishing items, 
the ratio C!,,/G determines the inain char- 
acteristics of the fire. If [l,,/G is less than a 
critical value, ( r,,/ G ) ,., ( equal to al~out  
1 8 . 2 k 1 ) ,  the rate of burning is roughly 
lxolx)rtional to CJ,,, and the fire is referred 
to as "vc~iitilation-cmitrolled." If, on the 
h a ~ ~ d ,  (7,,/G 3 ( U , / G )  ,.,., the rate of burn- 
ing is proportional to G; the fire is "fuel- 
surface-controlled." 
The duration of fully clevrloped fire can 
11e calculated from the following equations 
( Harrnathy 1972) : 
tor ventilation-colitrolled conditioirr 
i f  [ I , ,  'G < 18.2, r = 5.72G'CTI, ; ( 7 )  
for fuel-surface-controlled conditions 
if 7 G 2 1 . 2  , 7 = 0.314 . (8)  
I t  is important to note from Eq. ( 8 )  that for 
fuel-surface-controlled conditions, the dura- 
tion of fully developed fire (for conven- 
tional furnishing) is very short, about 19 
min (0.314 h ) ,  and independent of the fire 
loacl and ventilation. 
Unfortunately, the calculation of the two 
fire severity parameters, T ,  and qE,  is some- 
what more complicated. I t  involves the 
simultaneous solution of two equations 
[Eqs. (51)  and (62)  in Harniathy 19721. 
Figure 5 shows the variation of the clura- 
tion of fully developed fire, r, with the "air 
flow factor," defined as ( U,/G) I ( [J,,/G) ,.,., 
as calculated froni Eqs. ( 7 )  and ( 8 ) .  I t  
also depicts the dependence of the tem- 
perature, T,, on the air flow factor, at three 
values of the "specific fire load," G/A,: 
(where Ap is the floor area of the com- 
partment). In  Fig. 6 the variation of the 
effective heat flux, q ~ ,  is plotted against 
the air flow factor for the same three values 
of the specific fire load. Although the 
curvcs of T, and qfi: relate to a particular 
set of conditions (described in Butcher et 
al. 1966, 1967), they can be regarded as 
typical. Attention is called to the fact that 
the highest teniperaturcs usually occur at 
relatively low air flow rates (in other words, 
under ventilation-controlled conditions ) , 
whereas tllc maxima of the effective heat 
flux always coincide with ( U , / G )  ,.,.. 
The designer, guided by statistical data 
on specific fire load in various occupancies 
(Witteveen 1%6; Baldwin et  al. 1970; Nils- 
son 1970; Herggren and Erikson 1970; 
Cerberus Alarni 1971; Bryl 1975; Cul- 
ver 1976) and by the preceding dis- 
cussion, can make a fair estimate of the fire 
severity parameters for all compartments of 
the building under design. Once this in- 
formation is available, he can proceed with 
specifying for each building element the re- 
ipirements that will ensure its satisfactory 
performance in case of fire. 
A clear distinction must be made be- 
tween "key structural eler~ients" and "divid- 
ing elements." Key elemc~nts are those, the 
HUILIIING DESIGN AND FIRE IlALAHD 137 
I I I 
- T g  
- -- T 
V E N T I L A T I O N -  F U E L - S U R F A C E  
- 
I--- -------------- 
I I I 
A I R  F l  O W  F A C T O R  l U , I G I  I I U a l G l c r  
l:i(:. 5. D ~ ~ r a t i o n  of fr~lly dc~eloped fire and avvrage fire tcn>pel.atl~re ( the  latter for a specific set 
of c,onditio~~s ). 
collapse or major dcfor~nation of which nlay 
endanger the stability of the building. It  is 
advisable that the appropriate fire protec- 
tion of eacli of these key elements be eval- 
uated from comprehensive heat flow stud- 
ies, sirnilar to those outlined in Harmathy 
( 1976a, 1977). If there is a possibility, how- 
evc*r rc,niote, that the element may become 
exposed to fire on both sides, two values of 
the effective heat flnx, q,, and of the period 
of fully developed fire, r (one for the com- 
partmcut ui~der study 2nd one for the ad- 
jacent conipartment), will form the basic 
input information. All realistic possibilities 
of simultaneous and delayed exposure of 
the two sides to fire should be examined. 
Studies of this kind indicated that simulta- 
neous exposure of thc two sides does not 
necessarily represent the most adverse con- 
ditions; increasingly delayed exposure of 
t l ~ .  reversc side may cr?ate increasingly 
detrimental conditions. 
Such scrupulous studies are not justified, 
Iiowever, in the case of siinple dividing ele- 
ments that are not parts of the load-bearing 
network. Beciiuse, once thc fire has spread 
to its reverse side, a clividiilg element has 
no further role in the provision of fire safe- 
ty, there is no need for requiring it to with- 
stand fire from both sides. In fact. if tJ,,lG 
for both adjacent compartments is higher 
than the critical value, 18.2 h-', specifying 
a 30-mi11 fire resistance (as  evaluated from 
standard fire resistance test) is adequate. 
This claim is based on the finding that for 
fuel-surface-controlled fires the duration of 
fully-developed fire is only about 19 min 
[see Eq. (8)  1. 
Figure 5 shows that not only are fuel- 
surface-controlled fires, short, but they de- 
velop at relatively low temperatures. The 
designer may, therefore, consciously aim at 
providing conditions that would favour 
fuel-surface-controlled fires. In other words, 
the designer has a certain degree of free- 
don1 in designil~g the fire itself, as well as 
the protection against it. 
Fuel-surface-controlled conditions are ex- 
pected to prevail if relatively large windows 
are selected, such that 
I . l<ffc.ctivc. hc.;~t flu\ ( f o ~  ;I specific sct of conditio~~s ) . 
[This relationship has been ol~tai~red by ex- 
pressing ( l l , , /G)  ,.,. ill ternls of \vi~lclo\v area 
tvith thc aid of Eq, ( 6 )  1. 
Altliongh thv possil~ility of fire spread 
rrlust nevor l)e ruled out i l l  the design for 
fire safety, the designer is well advised to 
11sc all avnilal~le tckchniqt~c,~ to riiinirnizc the 
pro1,;ibility of spread. The simplest and 
most effective way of achieving this is 
specifying self-closing compartment doors. 
Several I~uilding codes hnvc already made 
the, use of self-closi~ig doors mandatory in 
lriglr-rise buildii~gs. Unfortmlately, hinged 
tloors may presrnt some problems if fire 
I)re;~ks out in one of t l ~ c  lower. storeys tlur- 
ills the winter heating season. After the 
\vi~rtlows of the fire cell are I~rokell, it may 
I)e tlifficnlt or even impossible to open thc 
corridor cloor Ixcause of the large pressure 
difft~rences l~etween its t\vo sides. I t  would 
Inore practical to use weight-operated 
sliding doors of sollie light construction. If 
sl~clr doors are hung by rollers fro111 a con- 
ccnled rail and sl~pported 11y two more rol- 
Icrs 1rc:lr the l)ottoirr, as sllowlr ill Fig. 7, 
opeiling them at any pressure difference 
would require less force than that required 
to open a hinged door equipped with a clos- 
ing device at no pressure difference. Other 
solutions that offer siiiiilar advantages are 
also available (Williamson 1976). 
A door that ren ia i~~s  closed during the 
fire is an cffective barrier not only against 
the spread of fire but also against the spread 
of smoke. A numerical example worked 
out for n 20-storey building, with the firc 
occurring in the winter in one of the first- 
storc,y compartme~its, indicated that the 
rate of smoke spread is reduced by a factor 
of at least 30 I)y closing the door of the firc 
cell. Further reduction call he achieved by 
the application of a spccial material (Rad- 
ische Anilin) along the edges that would 
c x ~ a ~ l d  on  heating to fill gaps nromnd the 
cloor. 
Vertical or horizontal spread of fire can 
often 1)e traced back to the pelletratio11 of 
the floors or walls by plastic DWV (drain, 
waste, and vent) pipes and telephone or 
c,lectric cn1)lcs. Fire tests indicate (h4c- 
HUILIIINC 1)ESIGN AXTI FIKE HAZAHI) 
(inire 1973, 1975; Orals a11c1 Quigg 1976) 
that it is sound practice to surromld these 
pipes and cal~les witli a noncornl~nstible 
packing housed in a thin sheet steel sleeve 
extc~lding 1)eyond the surface of the floor 
or wall. 
A systematic investigation condllcted in 
Australia (Corn. Exp. Build. Stn. 1971) 
colrfirmed the earlier Hritish finding that 
2-ft projrctions over the windows of a 
1)uilding do not prevent flal-ncs issuing 
through windows from curling back and 
igniting the storey alIove. I t  was found, 
ho~vever, that projections wider than 3-4 ft  
are effective in keeping the flanles away 
from the face of the building and in reduc- 
ing radiatioll to the storey above to an ac- 
cel>t;tl)le level. 
(:ontin~~ous balcoi~ies and open corridors 
call play a useful part in protecting build- 
ings against the vertical spread of fires. Un- 
fortunately, their use is rarely considered 
nowadays even for rcsideiltial buildings, 
rcacliing the interior, illcrease the builclinr 
l,ecallse they cut dowll the llatllral clayligllt FIG. 7. Self-closing sliding door. 
&, <, 
costs, and may produce acsthctically unde- 
sirttble effects. 
Simple "flame, tletcctor5" (Ilarmathy 
19761)) can provide the same degree of pro- 
tection its contil~uous balconies and ouen 
corridors. at substantiallv lower cost and 
without the aforementioned drawbacks. 
They are light metal panels momlted above 
each \vindow ancl held in vertical position 
I)y a fusil~le part, possi11ly a nut. The width 
of thesc, l~anels is at least 3 ft 3 inches and 
tllc,ir length equal to the wi~ldow breadth 
plus about 4 ft. As Fig. 8 shows, tlie dcflec- 
tor falls down to assume horizontal ~osi t ion 
when activated by flames issuing fro111 the 
window below. Covered with baked-on 
enamel, or furnishecl witli bronzed, im- 
printed surfaces, for exainple, the deflec- 
tors may 1)e consciously applied to the 
11uildillg as decorative, elements. 
h high degree of fire safety can be 
achieved by a new techniql~c referred to as 
"fire drai~~age" ( Harnlathy 1976b ) . It uti- 
lizes the energy of fire in three ways: (1) 
1)y drawing air into tlie fire cell in (pan-  
tities that cnsure fuel-surface-coiltrolled 
conditions, i.e., short fire duration ancl rela- 
tively lo\v firc temperature; ( 2 )  1)y keeping 
the pressure in the fire cell below thc pres- 
sure levels prevailing in the neighbouring 
spaces; and (3) by ren~oving the smoke and 
flan~es from the fire cell in a safe and or- 
ganized manner. 
Figure 9 shows a largc, umcompai-t- 
mented space equipped with a fire drain- 
age system. The ceiling is divided into 
many rectangular areas by a series of re- 
tracted fold-1111 drop curtains, 1, made of 
light-gauge inetal and ecyuipped with 
weightier bottom pieces. Thc purpose of 
these curtains is twofold: they restrict the 
spread of flames and smoke during the 
growth period of fire; and when activated 
by tlie firc,, they slide clown in grooves, 2, 
to floor skirting boards, 3, and surround the 
cell on fire, 4, leaving only four openings, 
5 ,  11roperly sized for controllcd ventilation. 
There is a column, 6, in the center of each 
cell. A well-insulated "drainage duct,'' 7, 
runs the entire height of the building in the 
interior of the columns. Each duct has four 
"acccss gates," 8 (insulated on the duct 
I"I~:.  8. Flame deflectors in opcl.ation. 
side.), near the ceiling on (very storey, 11y 
\vhieli it servcs a num1)er of cells located on 
the successive storeys. These gates are nor- 
mally closed by simple fusible parts. There 
are two or four "release gates" (not shown) 
at t l ~ e  top end of each drainage duct above 
the roof level. They are held closed by the 
tension of a heat-destructible line extending 
to the bottom of thc duct. 
As fire in the ccll starts to build up, the 
access gates, 8, open shortly l~eforc the ac- 
tivation of the drop curtains, 1. The fire 
gases enter the drainage duct, 7, and, by 
destroying the tensioning line, cause the 
rclease gates at the top to open. Not only 
are the gases and flaines safcly withdrawn 
from the building, but the suction created 
by the coluinil of hot combmtion products 
in the duct creates a depression ill the fire 
cell and thus prevents the dispcrsioll of 
smoke and fire to the neighbouring spaces. 
The design of the fire drainage system 
Frc:. 9. Uncoillpartrnc.~lted spaw eclnippccl with fire drainage system 
involves the calculation of the cross-sec- 
tional area of the drainage duct and the 
area of entry of air into the cell (the sum 
of the four openings, 5, in the floor skirt- 
ing boards). The procedure is described 
Ilriefly by Harmathy ( 1976b ) . 
Since operatioil of the fire drainage sys- 
tem does not rely on the availability of 
water and electricity at the timc of fire ( the 
chiming remnants of the fuel can be 
extinguished with some chcnlical suppres- 
sant),  its applicatiol~ may offer special ad- 
vantages in remote, poorly serviced com- 
m~~tlities, or with buildings the contents of 
which are sensitive to water damage. The 
disadvantage of the system is that with its 
use the normal loss expectancy is an entire 
cell and, therefore, it is not suitable for the 
protection of buildings with valuable con- 
tents. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the most important aspects of 
the design of- buildings for fire safety 
are governecl by building codes, a com- 
petent design team is c'1pa11lc of greatly 
increasing the level of safety beyond that 
provided by the stereotyped application of 
regulations, usually without any additional 
eupe~lditurrs, or even at substantial savings 
to the builder. I t  is extremely important 
to rcalize, however, that fire safety is not 
something that can be added on after coin- 
pletion of the building plans. To be really 
effective, the problem of fire safety must 
be taken into account from the first step of 
architectural design. 
Discussion in this paper was confined to 
the more or less conventional types of build- 
ings of residential, business, and institu- 
tional occupancies. With buildings erected 
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